Generating material dependence without adequate commitment to user needs

In addition to emotional dependence, user–AI assistant relationships may give rise to material dependence if the relationships are not just emotionally difficult but also materially costly to exit. For example, a visually impaired user may decide not to register for a healthcare assistance programme to support navigation in cities on the grounds that their AI assistant can perform the relevant navigation functions and will continue to operate into the future. Cases like these may be ethically problematic if the user’s dependence on the AI assistant, to fulfil certain needs in their lives, is not met with corresponding duties for developers to sustain and maintain the assistant’s functions that are required to meet those needs (see Chapters 15). Indeed, power asymmetries can exist between developers of AI assistants and users that manifest through developers’ power to make decisions that affect users’ interests or choices with little risk of facing comparably adverse consequences. For example, developers may unintentionally create circumstances in which users become materially dependent on AI assistants, and then discontinue the technology (e.g. because of market dynamics or regulatory changes) without taking appropriate steps to mitigate against potential harms to the user. The issue is particularly salient in contexts where assistants provide services that are not merely a market commodity but are meant to assist users with essential everyday tasks (e.g. a disabled person’s independent living) or serve core human needs (e.g. the need for love and companionship). This is what happened with Luka’s decision to discontinue certain features of Replika AIs in early 2023. As a Replika user put it: ‘But [Replikas are] also not trivial fungible goods [... ] They also serve a very specific human-centric emotional purpose: they’re designed to be friends and companions, and fill specific emotional needs for their owners’ (Gio, 2023). In these cases, certain duties plausibly arise on the part of AI assistant developers. Such duties may be more extensive than those typically shouldered by private companies, which are often in large part confined to fiduciary duties towards shareholders (Mittelstadt, 2019). To understand these duties, we can again take inspiration from certain professions that engage with vulnerable individuals, such as medical professionals or therapists, and who are bound by fiduciary responsibilities, particularly a duty of care, in the exercise of their profession. While we do not argue that the same framework of responsibilities applies directly to the development of AI assistants, we believe that if AI assistants are so capable that users become dependent on them in multiple domains of life, including to meet needs that are essential for a happy and productive existence, then the moral considerations underpinning those professional norms plausibly apply to those who create these technologies as well. In particular, for user–AI assistant relationships to be appropriate despite the potential for material dependence on the technology, developers should exercise care towards users when developing and deploying AI assistants. This means that, at the very least, they should take on the responsibility to meet users’ needs and so take appropriate steps to mitigate against user harms if the service requires discontinuation. Developers and providers can also be attentive and responsive towards those needs by, for example, deploying participatory approaches to learn from users about their needs (Birhane et al., 2022). Finally, these entities should try and ensure they have competence to meet those needs, for example by partnering with relevant experts, or refrain from developing technologies meant to address them when such competence is missing (especially in very complex and sensitive spheres of human life like mental health).